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Do reporters have the right to conduct interviews in courthouse hall-
ways? May political activists hand out leaflets in shopping centres? Are 
journalists entitled to attend disciplinary hearings in the chambers of the 
law society? Do advertisers have the right to place ads on public buses?  
These questions have one thing in common: they all concern the ex-
ercise of freedom of expression in certain locations — courthouses, 
shopping centres, private offices, buses. But do all locations without ex-
ception benefit from the guarantee of freedom of expression in section 
2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1 or do some fall 
beyond its scope? 
The Supreme Court first dealt with this issue in the Commonwealth 
case2 in 1991, where it split into three distinct camps, each supporting a 
different approach. This split remained unresolved until the Montréal 
case3 in 2005, where the Court endorsed the view that certain places — 
such as private government offices — are categorically excluded from 
section 2(b) because of their historical or actual function. However, the 
Court advanced this view only tentatively, in an explicit obiter dictum 
that played no actual role in the decision. So it is a matter of interest that 
                                                                                                             
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. 
1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c.11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. Section 2(b) provides: “Everyone has the following fundamental 
freedoms: ... (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press 
and other media of communication; ...”.  
2 Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada, [1991] S.C.J. No. 3, [1991] 1 
S.C.R. 139 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Commonwealth”].  
3 Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc., [2005] S.C.J. No. 63, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Montréal”].  
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in the recent Vancouver case,4 the Supreme Court has thrown caution to 
the winds and formally endorsed the Montréal approach. 
I believe the Court has taken a wrong turn on this point, one that 
leads down a blind alley. My task is to show why and to point a way out. 
I start with the Irwin Toy case,5 which establishes the basic analytical 
framework for section 2(b). I then review the line of cases in which the 
Supreme Court specifically addresses the question of location, culminat-
ing in the Vancouver decision.6 I conclude with a critique of these cases 
and a suggested solution.7 
II. THE BASIC FRAMEWORK 
According to Irwin Toy,8 when there is a claim that freedom of ex-
pression has been infringed, a court follows a three-stage process. At the 
first stage, the court inquires whether the claimant’s activity qualifies as 
expression under section 2(b). If the answer is affirmative, the court 
moves to the second stage where it considers whether the impugned gov-
ernmental act can actually be said to infringe the right. If an infringement 
is found to exist, the court moves to the third and final stage where it 
asks whether the infringement can be justified under section 1 of the 
Charter, which allows for reasonable limits on Charter rights.9 
In dealing with the first stage, the Supreme Court distinguishes be-
tween the content and the form of the activity. In relation to content, the 
Court observes that freedom of expression was entrenched in the Consti-
tution so as to ensure that everyone can manifest their thoughts, opinions 
and beliefs, however unpopular, distasteful or contrary to the main-
stream. In a free, pluralistic and democratic society, we prize a diversity 
                                                                                                             
4 Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v. Canadian Federation of Students – Brit-
ish Columbia Component, [2009] S.C.J. No. 31, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Vancouver”].  
5 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Québec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Irwin Toy”].  
6 Supra, note 4. 
7 For valuable background, see B. Jamie Cameron, “A Bumpy Landing: The Supreme 
Court of Canada and Access to Public Airports Under Section 2(b) of the Charter” (1992) 2 Media 
& Communications L. Rev. 91; Richard Moon, “Access to Public and Private Property Under Free-
dom of Expression” (1988) 20 Ottawa L. Rev. 339; and Richard Moon, “Freedom of Expression and 
Property Rights” (1988) 52 Sask. L. Rev. 243.  
8 Supra, note 5. The majority opinion was jointly authored by Dickson C.J.C. and Lamer 
and Wilson JJ. The following account draws on paras. 40-53.  
9 Section 1 provides: “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights 
and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demon-
strably justified in a free and democratic society.”  
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of ideas and opinions for their inherent value both to the community and 
to the individual. In the words of Rand J., freedom of expression is “little 
less vital to man’s mind and spirit than breathing is to his physical exis-
tence”.10  
In light of this fact, the Court concludes that we cannot exclude hu-
man activity from the scope of guaranteed free expression on the basis of 
the content or meaning being conveyed. If the activity conveys or at-
tempts to convey a meaning, it has expressive content and prima facie 
falls within the scope of the guarantee. The Court notes that some human 
activity is purely physical and does not convey or attempt to convey a 
meaning. It might be difficult to characterize certain mundane tasks, like 
parking a car, as having expressive content. However, if the claimant can 
show that such an activity is performed to convey a meaning, it would 
fall within the protected sphere.  
For example, an unmarried person might, as part of a public protest, 
park in a zone reserved for spouses of government employees in order 
to express dissatisfaction or outrage at the chosen method of allocating 
a limited resource. If that person could demonstrate that his activity did 
in fact have expressive content, he would, at this stage, be within the 
protected sphere and the s. 2(b) challenge would proceed.11 
This example is interesting because it relates to a location (a zone in 
a parking lot) that is closed to the general public and reserved specifi-
cally for the spouses of government employees. Significantly, the Court 
treats the application of section 2(b) here as unproblematic so long as the 
activity has expressive content. 
The Court goes on to discuss the requisite form of expressive acts. 
Here again it adopts a generous approach, holding that expressive con-
tent can be conveyed through an infinite variety of forms, such as the 
written or spoken word, the arts, and even physical gestures or acts. The 
only activities excluded are those that take the form of violence; clearly 
murderers and rapists cannot invoke freedom of expression to justify 
their acts. 
The Court now turns to the second stage of the inquiry, which deals 
with the question of infringement. It holds that a governmental act in-
fringes freedom of expression if it restricts a claimant’s attempt to convey 
meaning in either purpose or effect, with either mode being sufficient. 
                                                                                                             
10 Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.J. No. 13, [1957] S.C.R. 285, at 306 (S.C.C.).  
11 Irwin Toy, supra, note 5, at para. 41.  
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In relation to purpose, the Court says that a governmental act in-
fringes section 2(b) if it singles out particular meanings that are not to be 
conveyed or restricts a form of expression in order to control the audi-
ence’s access to the meaning being conveyed or the speaker’s ability to 
convey it. On the other hand, where the government aims to control only 
the physical consequences of certain human activity, regardless of the 
meaning being conveyed, its purpose is not to control expression. So, for 
example, a rule against handing out pamphlets restricts a particular form 
of expression (pamphlets) and so infringes section 2(b). By contrast, an 
anti-littering law only aims to control the physical consequences of cer-
tain conduct regardless of its meaning and so does not infringe the 
section in purpose. 
However, even if the purpose of the governmental act passes muster, 
the act may still have an invalid effect. Here, says the Court, claimants 
must show that their activity promotes at least one of the basic values 
underlying freedom of expression, namely: (1) seeking and attaining the 
truth; (2) participating in social and political decision-making; and (3) 
individual self-fulfillment and human flourishing. For example, where 
demonstrators contend that an anti-noise by-law has the effect of limiting 
their freedom of expression by preventing them from shouting slogans, 
they must prove that their activity attempts to convey a meaning that re-
flects one of these values. 
It may be seen that the Court’s infringement test can be readily satis-
fied in most cases. Even where the governmental act does not aim to 
restrict expression, claimants will normally be able to show it has that 
effect. Indeed it is not easy to imagine situations where the latter would 
not hold true — not, at least, without resorting to unusual examples, such 
as shouting for shouting’s sake (but then, people usually shout for some 
purpose). 
In summary, for an activity to qualify as “expressive” at the first 
stage, a claimant need only show that it attempts to convey a meaning in 
a non-violent way. For a governmental act to infringe the right at the sec-
ond stage, it need only restrict it in purpose or effect. Since these hurdles 
are relatively low, in most cases the inquiry moves to the final stage, 
where the court considers whether the infringement may be justified un-
der section 1. Here a court applies the test laid down in the Oakes case12 
and considers the full range of factors bearing on both the governmental 
act and the expressive activity, balancing one off against the other. 
                                                                                                             
12 R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oakes”].  
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One feature of this scheme has a special relevance for our inquiry — 
and we will briefly note it here, postponing full discussion until later. The 
first stage of the Irwin Toy analysis focuses entirely on the expressive 
activity to the exclusion of the law or governmental act that allegedly 
infringes it. That is, the question whether an activity falls within the 
scope of section 2(b) depends entirely on the character of the activity — 
its content and form — and not at all on the character of the impugned 
restrictive law. An activity that fails to gain the protection of section 2(b) 
— such as a violent assault — is excluded because of its inherent attrib-
utes. The character of the restrictive law does not affect the matter one 
way or the other. It is only at the second and third stages of the inquiry 
that the court turns its attention to the law or act allegedly infringing the 
right. 
III. THE QUESTION OF LOCATION: THREE VIEWS 
At which stage in the Irwin Toy analysis does the question of location 
arise? The answer is not immediately clear; something may be said for 
each of the three stages. 
The question arose in the Commonwealth case.13 The claimants, who 
were officers of a fringe political group, undertook promotion and re-
cruitment activities at Montréal International Airport.14 The Airport was 
Crown property and governed by regulations issued under federal legis-
lation. Armed with placards, leaflets and magazines, the claimants 
walked through the departure area of the airport terminal — an area open 
to the public. They approached passers-by, informing them about the 
goals of the group and soliciting members, but they did not attempt to 
hold meetings, make speeches or use loudspeakers. A police officer 
asked them to stop. When they objected, they were taken to the assistant 
manager of the airport, who told them that regulations prohibited any 
business, undertaking, advertising or solicitation in the airport without 
ministerial authorization.  
The claimants brought an action seeking a declaration, inter alia, that 
the federal government had not respected their freedom of expression 
under section 2(b), arguing that the open areas of the airport constituted a 
                                                                                                             
13 Supra, note 2.  
14 The following account of the facts draws on Commonwealth, supra, note 2, at paras. 26, 
50-52, supplemented by Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada, [1986] F.C.J. No. 
1036, [1985] 2 F.C. 3, at paras. 1-4 (F.C.T.D.).  
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public forum where this freedom could be exercised. They were success-
ful at trial and the Crown appealed. When the case reached the Supreme 
Court of Canada, the Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the claim-
ants’ right to use the public areas of the airport for expressive purposes, 
with all judges agreeing that freedom of expression had been infringed 
and that the infringement could not be justified under section 1. How-
ever, in reasoning to this conclusion, the Court split into three factions, 
headed respectively by Chief Justice Antonio Lamer, Justice Beverley 
McLachlin and Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé.15 Each judge champi-
oned a different stage of the Irwin Toy analysis as the appropriate venue 
for discussing the issue of location: one arguing that it went to the ques-
tion of section 2(b)’s scope, another that it concerned the section’s 
infringement, and the third that it was a matter of reasonable limits under 
section 1. Their views merit detailed attention. 
1. Location and Scope 
In his opinion, Lamer C.J.C. argues that the question of expression 
on public property arises primarily at the first stage of the Irwin Toy 
analysis, where the court determines whether the expressive activity falls 
within the scope of section 2(b).16 He observes that the freedom of an 
individual to communicate in a place owned by the government must 
necessarily be circumscribed by the interests of the government and the 
citizenry as a whole. The individual will only be free to communicate in 
a place owned by the state if the form of expression is compatible with 
the principal function or intended purpose of the place. The form of ex-
pression cannot have the effect of depriving citizens of the effective 
operation of government services and undertakings. 
For example, says the Chief Justice, no one would suggest that an 
individual is free to shout a political message in the Library of Parlia-
ment. This form of expression is incompatible with the basic purpose of 
the place, which requires silence. When individuals communicate in a 
public place, they must consider the function of the place and adjust their 
means of communication accordingly. By contrast, wearing a T-shirt  
                                                                                                             
15 Justice Sopinka concurs with Lamer C.J.C., and Cory J. also expresses agreement with 
this basic approach (at para. 212). Justice Gonthier agrees with the approach of McLachlin J. (at 
para. 210). Justice LaForest leaves the question open for future consideration, while tending to fa-
vour the approach of McLachlin J. (at paras. 45-46).  
16 The following account is based on Commonwealth, supra, note 2, at paras. 1-22.  
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emblazoned with a political slogan would likely be consistent with the 
library’s purpose. 
The Chief Justice observes that the fact that one’s freedom of expres-
sion is intrinsically limited by the function of a public place is an 
application of the general rule that one’s rights are circumscribed by the 
rights of others. It also accords with observations made in the Irwin Toy 
case, where the Supreme Court held that certain forms of expression — 
notably acts of violence — do not enjoy the protection of section 2(b). 
If the expression takes a form that is inconsistent with the function of 
the place, it falls outside the sphere of section 2(b). To take another ex-
ample, says the Chief Justice, if people picketed in the middle of a busy 
highway, this form of expression might well be incompatible with the 
principal function of the place, which is to provide for the smooth flow 
of traffic. In such a case, freedom of expression would not be restricted if 
a government representative obliged the picketers to express themselves 
elsewhere. 
The Chief Justice concludes that it is only when claimants have 
proven that their form of expression is compatible with the function of 
the place that the requirements of section 2(b) will be satisfied and the 
analysis can proceed to section 1. While the state’s main interest is to 
ensure the effective operation of its property, that is not its only concern; 
there is also, for instance, the objective of maintaining law and order, 
which might justify certain limitations on section 2(b). Thus, the chair of 
a municipal council would generally be justified in limiting the speaking 
time allotted to councillors so as to give everyone a chance to contribute. 
Such a concern, says Lamer C.J.C., comes under section 1 of the Charter, 
as do many others. 
This last example highlights a difficulty with the Chief Justice’s ap-
proach. It is not clear how to draw the line between matters that arise 
under section 2(b) and those that are deferred to section 1. If one munici-
pal councillor insists on shouting in the council chamber while another 
one speaks for hours on end, it is not clear why the former matter arises 
at the first stage under section 2(b) (as the Library of Parliament example 
suggests), while the latter matter is left for section 1 (as the municipal 
council example indicates). Arguably, restrictions on both shouting and 
filibustering are equally suited for consideration under section 1. 
Indeed, the Chief Justice’s overall approach is somewhat surprising 
given his initial observations on the fundamental differences between the 
252 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
Constitutions of the United States and Canada.17 The American Bill of 
Rights, he observes, contains no clause similar to section 1 of the Char-
ter, which gives governments the opportunity to justify limitations on 
constitutional rights. American doctrine on the question of expressive 
location results from an attempt to strike a balance between individual 
and governmental interests in the absence of a provision equivalent to 
section 1. Canadian courts, he concludes, should disregard the “nominal-
istic” approach taken by American courts in this area and instead balance 
the underlying interests directly. It is curious, then, that the Chief Justice 
assigns such a limited role to section 1 in carrying out this balancing. 
2. Location and Infringement 
By contrast, McLachlin J. argues that the question of location arises, 
not at the first stage of the Irwin Toy process, but rather at the second 
stage where a court decides if the governmental act actually infringes the 
claimant’s freedom of expression.18 She begins by observing that free-
dom of expression does not historically imply freedom to express oneself 
wherever one pleases. In other words, freedom of expression does not 
automatically comport freedom of forum. For example, it has not histori-
cally conferred a right to use another’s private property for expressive 
purposes. Proprietors have the right to determine who uses their property 
and for what purposes. Moreover, the Charter does not extend to private 
actions. So it is clear, she concludes, that section 2(b) does not give the 
right to use private property as a forum for expression. 
However, the matter is less clear when public property is involved. 
Since the Charter applies to governmental action, the government must 
make its property available as a forum for public expression to the extent 
required by section 2(b). How far, then, should the section be read as 
guaranteeing access to government property for use as a forum for public 
expression? 
When the right of free expression is viewed in its historical and phi-
losophical context, says McLachlin J., several matters become clear. 
First, the government qua proprietor does not have the absolute right to 
prohibit and regulate expression on all property it owns. To the contrary, 
there is a venerable tradition that some types of state property — such as 
                                                                                                             
17 Id., at paras. 7-9.  
18 This account draws on id., at paras. 214-52.  
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streets and parks — are proper forums for public expression. Were this 
not true, little would remain of the right. 
On the other hand, it is clear that section 2(b) does not comprehend 
the right to use all government property as an expressive forum, regard-
less of its function:  
There is no historical precedent, whether in England, the United States 
or this country, for extending freedom of expression to purely private 
areas merely because they happen to be on government-owned 
property. Freedom of expression has not traditionally been recognized 
to apply to such places or means of communication as internal 
government offices, air traffic control towers, publicly-owned 
broadcasting facilities, prison cells and judges’ private chambers. To 
say that the guarantee of free speech extends to such arenas is to 
surpass anything the framers of the Charter could have intended.19 
This conclusion, says McLachlin J., is supported by pragmatic con-
siderations. The state should not be obliged to defend in the courts 
restrictions on expression which do not raise the values and interests tra-
ditionally associated with the free speech guarantee. Any other view 
threatens to trivialize the Charter guarantee. A threshold test is required 
to screen out cases that clearly fall beyond the purview of section 2(b), 
even before reaching section 1. The threshold should not be so high as to 
exclude persons with legitimate claims. Nevertheless, a claimant should 
have to make a prima facie case that expression on the public property in 
question engages traditional free speech concerns and hence falls within 
the ambit of section 2(b). 
Justice McLachlin concludes that the protection afforded by section 
2(b) lies somewhere between the extremes of absolute government con-
trol over expression on state-owned property on the one hand and 
protection for all expression on state-owned property on the other. She 
acknowledges that the “compatibility with function” test proposed by 
Lamer C.J.C. represents such an intermediate approach, but she ques-
tions whether it is a useful and appropriate tool for screening out claims. 
Doubtless, the compatibility of the property’s purpose with free expres-
sion is a factor in determining whether a governmental restriction is 
constitutional under section 1. However, it is doubtful whether it is the 
only factor. It is also unclear if it properly arises at the initial stage under 
section 2(b). Moreover, argues McLachlin J., the concept of function pre-
sents difficulties. Does it mean normal function? Minimal or essential 
                                                                                                             
19 Id., at para. 227.  
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function? Optimal function? At what point does expression become in-
compatible with function? Presumably, it is only severe impairments of 
function that would render section 2(b) inapplicable, while limitations 
relating to optimal (as opposed to minimal) function would fall to be jus-
tified under section 1. Yet drawing this line may prove difficult in 
practice. 
In short, argues McLachlin J., the concept of function proves to be a 
relative one. In some cases, the right of free expression might be consid-
ered important enough to interfere to some extent with the function of 
government property. In others, the impairment of function will be so 
great in comparison with the expressive interest as to justify exclusion or 
limitation of the expression. The concept of function thus involves a bal-
ancing of interests which arguably serves better as part of the section 1 
test than as a threshold for screening out claims which raise no prima 
facie expressive interest. 
So, concludes McLachlin J., the test under section 2(b) should be 
primarily definitional rather than one of balancing. Once it has been de-
termined that expression at the location in question falls within the scope 
of section 2(b), the analysis moves to section 1 where the court weighs 
and balances the conflicting interests — the individual’s interest in using 
the forum for expressive purposes against the state’s interest in limiting 
expression on the particular property. The problem, then, is one of “de-
fining what types of government property should prima facie be regarded 
as constitutionally available for forums for public expression”.20 
At this point, the argument takes a surprising turn. Given McLachlin 
J.’s characterization of the problem, one would expect her to proceed by 
characterizing the kinds of government property that qualify for constitu-
tional protection. Instead, she shifts the focus from government property 
as such to governmental restrictions on expression in certain locations. 
She refers to the Irwin Toy decision, which, as seen earlier, distinguishes 
between two classes of restrictions: (1) those that have the purpose of 
preventing certain meanings from being conveyed; and (2) those that are 
not aimed at content but have the effect of restricting expression. She 
observes that limitations on forums for public expression may fall into 
either of these classes. For example, a ban on anti-war messages on Par-
liament Hill might be viewed as essentially content-based, because it 
identifies certain messages that may not be conveyed in that location. On 
the other hand, many restrictions on forums for public expression are 
                                                                                                             
20 Id., at para. 240.  
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content-neutral. Their purpose is not to single out particular meanings but 
rather to avoid the harmful consequences of the conduct in question, such 
as by preventing interference with the proper functioning of government-
owned property. 
This analysis, argues McLachlin J., supports a two-part test, which 
depends on the class into which the restriction falls. If the government’s 
purpose is to restrict the content of expression through limiting the fo-
rums where it can be made, then this restriction is usually impermissible 
and section 2(b) applies. On the other hand, if the restriction is content-
neutral, the claimant must prove that it has the effect of restricting free-
dom of expression. In this case, Irwin Toy requires the claimants to show 
that their expressive activity in the location promotes one of the purposes 
underlying section 2(b), namely: (1) the seeking and obtaining of truth; 
(2) participation in social and political decision-making; and (3) the en-
couragement of diversity in forms of individual self-fulfilment and 
human flourishing. Only if such a purpose can be established is the 
claimant entitled to the protection of section 2(b).  
The effect, says McLachlin J., is to screen out many potential claims 
to the use of government property as a forum for public expression. 
While the precise boundaries of these three purposes may be a little un-
certain, the central elements of the test are relatively clear and capable of 
ready application. 
 It would be difficult to contend that these purposes are served by 
“public” expression in the sanctum of the Prime Minister’s office, an 
airport control tower, a prison cell or a judge’s private chambers, to 
return to examples where it seems self-evident that the guarantee of 
free expression has no place. These are not places of public debate 
aimed at promoting either the truth or a better understanding of social 
and political issues. Nor is expression in these places related to the 
open and welcoming environment essential to maximization of 
individual fulfillment and human flourishing. 
 It is equally clear that the purposes of the guarantee of free 
expression are served by permitting expression in other forums and that 
s. 2(b) should apply to them. To borrow the language of the American 
“public forum” doctrine, the use of places which have by tradition or 
designation been dedicated to public expression for purposes of 
discussing political or social or artistic issues would clearly seem to be 
linked to the values underlying the guarantee of free speech.21 
                                                                                                             
21 Id., at paras. 249-250.  
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What is puzzling about this analysis is its contention that one may 
identify the classes of government property that merit section 2(b) pro-
tection, not by analyzing the characteristics of such properties, but by 
scrutinizing governmental restrictions on their use. For under the latter 
approach it seems reasonably clear that expression on a given property 
will sometimes qualify for protection and sometimes not, depending on 
the purpose and effect of the particular restrictive measure. This seems 
true even of places that McLachlin J. identifies as obviously beyond the 
scope of section 2(b). For example, where a prison policy prohibits in-
mates from writing letters complaining of ill-treatment, the policy singles 
out certain meanings that are not to be conveyed and hence has the pur-
pose of limiting freedom of expression. So section 2(b) would 
presumably apply to prison cells in this context, notwithstanding 
McLachlin J.’s claim that a prison cell is a place “where it seems self-
evident that the guarantee of free expression has no place”. If the test is 
intended to exclude certain governmental locations on a “definitional” 
basis, it does not appear to succeed. 
In any case, it is doubtful if the test serves an effective screening 
function. Even in cases where governmental limits on the use of public 
property do not have the purpose of restricting expression, in most cases 
they surely have the effect of doing so. Justice McLachlin’s argument on 
this point is not very convincing. She treats it as self-evident, for exam-
ple, that public expression in the Prime Minister’s office would not serve 
any of the underlying purposes of section 2(b). But this seems dubious. 
What better example of political participation than a private chat with the 
Prime Minister? The reason why a claim of expressive access to the 
Prime Minister’s office is objectionable does not lie in its purposes 
(which may well serve the causes of truth and political participation) but 
rather in its impact on the functioning of that office, which requires a 
high degree of privacy. This consideration suggests the need for a balanc-
ing process akin to that proposed by Lamer C.J.C. — a process which 
McLachlin J. has cogently argued belongs under section 1 rather than 
section 2(b). 
3. Location and Reasonable Limits 
This point brings us to the approach espoused by L’Heureux-Dubé 
J.22 She argues that expressive activities cannot automatically be  
                                                                                                             
22 The following account draws on id., at paras. 110-148.  
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excluded from section 2(b) simply because they take place in locations 
not traditionally associated with public expression. Limits on expression 
in such locations may well be reasonable, but the government has the 
burden of demonstrating this under section 1. Even if a group of demon-
strators were to choose the chambers of the Supreme Court of Canada as 
a forum for expression, governmental restrictions on their activities 
would require justification under section 1 — though L’Heureux-Dubé J. 
hastens to add that presumably such justification could be readily fur-
nished. 
When calibrating the section 1 barometer, the political quality of the 
stifled expression must be weighed against the governmental interests. 
Unlike the American system, in which distinct tests are required for vari-
ous “types” of expression, section 1 is flexible enough to accommodate 
all such types, with the result depending on the governmental objectives 
and the means selected to advance them. This enables the court to take a 
contextual rather than a categorical approach, focusing not only on the 
scope of the right but also on the setting in which the expressive claim is 
made. 
In the case at hand, observes L’Heureux-Dubé J., the government re-
lies heavily on its property interest in the airport, arguing that it has the 
same rights as any other owner with respect to its property — rights that 
are exclusive. The only qualification arises from the fact that the gov-
ernment often dedicates its property for use by the public, which 
consequently has the right to use it for the purposes intended by govern-
ment. 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé agrees that the section 1 analysis must be 
sensitive to the unique relationship between government and its property. 
However, if members of the public had no right whatsoever to distribute 
leaflets or engage in other expressive activity on government-owned 
property except with permission, they would have little opportunity to 
exercise their rights. Only those with enough wealth to own land or mass 
media would be able to engage in free expression, which would subvert 
the basic purposes of section 2(b). 
On the other hand, says L’Heureux-Dubé J., the Charter’s framers 
did not intend such places as internal government offices, air traffic con-
trol towers, prison cells and judges’ chambers to be made available for 
leafletting or demonstrations. Evidently freedom of expression under 
section 2(b) does not provide a right of access to all property, whether 
public or private. Such a wholesale transformation of government prop-
erty is not necessary to fulfil the Charter’s purposes or to avoid a stifling 
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of free expression. The logical compromise is to recognize that some, but 
not all, government-owned property is constitutionally open to the public 
for expressive activity. Restrictions on expression in certain places will 
obviously be harder to defend than in others. A number of criteria help 
determine which locations should be considered public, including: 
(1) the traditional openness of such property for expressive activity;  
(2) whether the public is ordinarily admitted to the property as of right; 
(3) the compatibility of the property’s purpose with such expressive ac-
tivities; 
(4) how far the property’s availability for expressive activity will help 
achieve the purposes of section 2(b); 
(5) the symbolic significance of the property for the message being 
communicated; and 
(6) the availability of other public arenas in the vicinity for expressive 
activities.23 
To sum up, L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s opinion presents a cogent argument 
for the view that section 1 is the most appropriate forum for dealing with 
the issue of location. The view is attractive because it respects the inter-
nal architecture of the Charter and allows for a contextual rather than 
categorical approach.24 Unfortunately, however, the opinion’s major 
point is sometimes obscured by language that could be taken to suggest 
that restrictions on expression in certain government-owned locations — 
internal government offices, air traffic control towers and the like — may 
be justified across the board. Yet it is precisely the advantage of section 1 
that it allows for a more fine-grained approach — one that acknowledges 
that, no matter what the location, certain restrictions on expression will 
not be justifiable, even if many others will.  
There is one significant objection to L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s approach 
— voiced especially by McLachlin J. — which should be noted here. 
According to the Oakes case,25 once a Charter inquiry moves to section 
1, the burden of proof always shifts from the claimant to the government. 
It seems counterintuitive, argues McLachlin J., that the government 
should have to justify in every case limitations on access to such places 
                                                                                                             
23 This summary is based on id., at para. 147.  
24 See Cameron, supra, note 7, at 95, 106-108. 
25 Supra, note 12.  
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as private governmental offices, judges’ chambers and security zones in 
airports. The problem is indeed a real one. However, it may arise less 
from L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s approach than from an overly rigid application 
of the Oakes formula. 
IV. THE AFTERMATH OF COMMONWEALTH 
For some years after the Commonwealth decision,26 the Supreme 
Court avoided any attempt to resolve the division of opinion in the case. 
When the issue of location arose in the Ramsden case27 in 1993, the 
Court held that, on the facts, the result was the same no matter which 
approach was taken. On any view, a municipal by-law banning posters 
on public property infringed freedom of expression in section 2(b) and 
could not be justified under section 1.  
Thus the matter stood for more than a decade. However, the issue 
could not be skirted indefinitely, and in 2005 it came up again in the 
Montréal case.28 The claimant was a strip club operating in a commercial 
zone of downtown Montreal. To attract customers, the club set up a loud-
speaker in its main entrance, which amplified the music and commentary 
from the show going on inside. One night, a police officer on patrol 
heard the music from a nearby intersection and charged the club with 
violating a municipal by-law that prohibited noise produced by sound 
equipment “heard from the outside”. In court, the club raised the defence 
of freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter. 
The trial judge rejected the argument and convicted the club. The 
case went on appeal, eventually reaching the Supreme Court of Canada. 
In a judgment written by Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin and Justice 
Marie Deschamps, the Court ruled by a strong majority that the by-law 
infringed the claimant’s freedom of expression but that it could be justi-
fied as a reasonable limit under section 1.29 As for the question of the by-
law’s application to the location in question — the public streets of 
Montreal — the Court concluded that on any of the three approaches 
proposed in the Commonwealth case, the emission of noise onto the pub-
lic street was protected by section 2(b). So it was unnecessary to 
                                                                                                             
26 Commonwealth, supra, note 2. 
27 Ramsden v. Peterborough (City), [1993] S.C.J. No. 87, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 1084 (S.C.C.).  
28 Montréal, supra, note 3.  
29 Justice Ian Binnie dissented.  
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determine which approach should be adopted.30 However, in an effort to 
clarify the matter, the Court went on to express the following views.  
The application of section 2(b) is not attracted by the mere fact of 
government ownership of the place. There has to be a further enquiry to 
determine if the place represents the type of public property which merits 
the section’s protection. Expressive activity should be excluded from the 
scope of section 2(b) only if its method or location clearly undermines 
the values that support the guarantee. The Court drew a parallel with vio-
lent modes of expression, which are not protected because they prevent 
dialogue, block the self-fulfilment of the victim and impede the search 
for truth.  
Following this line of thought, the Court proposes the following test: 
The basic question with respect to expression on government-owned 
property is whether the place is a public place where one would expect 
constitutional protection for free expression on the basis that expression 
in that place does not conflict with the purposes which s. 2(b) is 
intended to serve, namely (1) democratic discourse, (2) truth finding 
and (3) self-fulfillment. To answer this question, the following factors 
should be considered: 
(a) the historical or actual function of the place; and 
(b) whether other aspects of the place suggest that expression 
within it would undermine the values underlying free 
expression.31 
To some extent, as the Court observes, this test represents a fusion of 
several views expressed in the Commonwealth case. Notably, it picks up 
McLachlin J.’s reference to the basic values underpinning section 2(b) 
and attempts to incorporate these into the test. However in other respects 
the test seems more indebted to the approach of Lamer C.J.C. Thus it 
adopts his view that the question of location arises at the first stage of the 
analytical process, where the court considers the scope of section 2(b), 
rather than at the subsequent “infringement” stage, as McLachlin J. 
thought, or at the final “justification” stage, as L’Heureux-Dubé J. ar-
gued. It also reflects the Chief Justice’s emphasis on the function of the 
place, while making it clear that both historical and actual function are 
relevant. 
                                                                                                             
30 Montréal, supra, note 3, at paras. 60-70.  
31 Id., at para. 74.  
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Nevertheless, the test departs from Lamer C.J.C.’s approach in one 
fundamental way. It tacitly ignores his call for a “balancing” between the 
form of the expression and the function of the place, and so doing, rejects 
his view that no place is completely bereft of section 2(b) protection. 
Rather it adopts a broadly “categorical” approach, one that focuses on the 
character of the place and its general suitability for expression. In effect, 
the test aims at determining whether the place itself merits section 2(b) 
protection, regardless of the character of the expressive activity carried 
on there.  
In the Montréal case, the Court offers its viewpoint as an explicit 
obiter dictum. Nevertheless, dicta that fall from on high have a way of 
slipping into the mainstream of jurisprudence. Such is the case here. 
When the question of location arose in the recent Vancouver decision,32 
the majority of the Court simply reproduced the Montréal test and ap-
plied it. The claimants, a student group and a teachers’ federation, 
attempted to purchase advertising space on the sides of buses operated by 
public transit authorities in British Columbia.33 The student group sought 
to post ads encouraging more young people to vote in a forthcoming pro-
vincial election. For its part, the teachers’ federation wished to voice 
concerns about changes in the public education system. For years, the 
transit authorities had earned revenue by posting advertisements on their 
buses. However, they refused the claimants’ ads, invoking written poli-
cies that forbade ads expressing political viewpoints. The claimants went 
to court, arguing that the policies violated their freedom of expression.  
The trial court dismissed the action, concluding that section 2(b) was 
not infringed. The claimants appealed and the case found its way to the 
Supreme Court of Canada, which ruled by a strong majority that the ad-
vertising policies of the transit authorities infringed the claimants’ 
freedom of expression and could not be justified under section 1.  
Speaking for the majority, Justice Marie Deschamps explains that the 
Court has long taken a generous and purposive approach to the interpre-
tation of freedom of expression.34 An activity that conveys or attempts to 
convey meaning will prima facie be protected by section 2(b). Further-
more, in such cases as Commonwealth, Ramsden and Montréal, the 
Court recognized that the section protects the right to express oneself in 
certain public places. However, observes Deschamps J., section 2(b) is 
                                                                                                             
32 Supra, note 4.  
33 This summary is based on id., at paras. 2-7.  
34 The following account draws on id., at paras. 27-28, 36-47.  
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not without limits, and governments will not be required to justify every 
restriction on expression under section 1. The method or location of the 
expressive activity may exclude it from protection. Just as violent ex-
pression falls outside the scope of section 2(b), individuals do not have a 
constitutional right to express themselves on all government property. 
One basic issue, then, is whether the claimants’ proposed expressive ac-
tivity should be denied section 2(b) protection on the basis of its location 
— the sides of public buses.  
In dealing with this issue, Deschamps J. adopts the approach taken in 
the Montréal case and poses the following questions. First, do the claim-
ants’ proposed advertisements have expressive content that brings them 
within the prima facie scope of section 2(b)? Second, if so, does the 
method or location of this expression remove that protection? Third, if 
the expression is protected by section 2(b), do the transit authorities’ 
policies infringe the guarantee? Finally, if they do, can they be justified 
under section 1? 
For Deschamps J., the first question is not problematic, because the 
proposed ads clearly have expressive content. The third question is also 
uncontroversial, because the transit policies have the explicit purpose of 
restricting the content of ads, specifically targeting political speech. 
However, the second question, which concerns location, requires closer 
attention.  
Here Deschamps J. reproduces the Montréal test, focusing on two 
main factors: 
(1) the historical or actual function of the place; and 
(2) whether other aspects of the place suggest that expression within it 
would undermine the values underlying free expression. 
With respect to the first factor, Deschamps J. observes that the trial 
judge found there was no history of political advertising on buses, and 
that he considered this fact pivotal in ruling against the claimants. How-
ever, comments Deschamps J., content is not relevant to the 
determination of the function of a place. This conclusion, we may note, 
flows from the “definitional” character of the Montréal test, whereby the 
character of the particular expressive activity (to wit, political advertis-
ing) does not affect the question whether the place receives protection. 
Where the historical or current function of a place includes public 
expression, continues Deschamps J., this is a good indication that expres-
sion in that place is constitutionally protected. Thus, a podium erected for 
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public use in a park would necessarily have a function that does not con-
flict with the purposes of section 2(b) but rather enhances them. 
However, she notes, most cases are not this straightforward, because they 
concern places whose primary function is not expression. In such in-
stances it is useful to look at past or present practice, which can help 
identify any incidental functions that may have developed. 
Justice Deschamps applies this approach in the following passage: 
While it is true that buses have not been used as spaces for this type of 
expressive activity for as long as city streets, utility poles and town 
squares, there is some history of their being so used, and they are in 
fact being used for it at present. As a result, not only is there some 
history of use of this property as a space for public expression, but 
there is actual use — both of which indicate that the expressive activity 
in question neither impedes the primary function of the bus as a vehicle 
for public transportation nor, more importantly, undermines the values 
underlying freedom of expression.35 
We may note that, at the end of this passage, Deschamps J. strays into 
a form of “balancing test”, insofar as she considers the impact of the par-
ticular expressive activity on the function of the location. As seen earlier, 
the Montréal approach apparently frowns on such an exercise, focusing 
rather on the characteristics of the place as a venue for expression. 
Be that as it may, Deschamps J. now turns to the second factor men-
tioned in Montréal, namely, whether other aspects of the place suggest 
that expression within it would undermine the values underlying section 
2(b). She draws attention to the transit authority’s argument that the 
buses should be characterized as private publicly owned property, to 
which the public cannot reasonably expect access. However, she holds 
that this position is untenable. The very fact that members of the public 
have access to advertising space on buses indicates that they would ex-
pect constitutional protection of their expression in that space. Moreover, 
a bus is by nature a public, not a private, space. Unlike activities that take 
place in certain government buildings or offices, those that occur on pub-
lic buses do not require privacy and limited access. Buses operate on city 
streets and form an integral part of the public transportation system. Peo-
ple using the streets are exposed to messages on the sides of buses just as 
they are to messages on utility poles and other public spaces. Like a city 
street, a bus is a public place where individuals can interact with one an-
other and their surroundings. Thus, rather than undermining the purposes 
                                                                                                             
35 Id., at para. 42 (emphasis added). 
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of section 2(b), expression on the sides of buses could enhance those 
purposes by furthering democratic discourse and perhaps even truth-
finding and self-fulfilment. 
In sum, concludes Deschamps J., this is not a case in which the Court 
must decide whether to protect access to a space where the government 
has never before recognized a right to such access. Rather, the question is 
whether the side of a bus, as a public place where expressive activity is 
already occurring, is a location where constitutional protection for free 
expression would be expected. There is no aspect of the location that 
suggests that expression within it would undermine the values underlying 
free expression — to the contrary. It follows that the side of a bus is a 
location where expressive activity is protected by section 2(b). 
One might be forgiven, perhaps, for thinking this is much ado about 
nothing. The blandness of the Court’s conclusion seems disproportionate 
to the lengthy and prolix analysis. And indeed this is a major problem 
with the Montréal test. In the end, it is hard to see how location alone 
can ever serve to exclude the application of section 2(b) without refer-
ence to the character of the expressive activity and the laws restricting it. 
Let me explain. 
V. ANALYSIS 
Three basic approaches to the question of location may be identified. 
The first focuses simply on the characteristics of the place in question — 
inquiring into such matters as its historical and current functions and its 
general suitability for expressive activities. This approach, which is ex-
emplified by the Montréal decision, holds that the inquiry should be 
carried out at the first stage of the Irwin Toy process, which concerns it-
self with the scope of section 2(b). 
The second approach broadens the canvas somewhat and considers 
both the character of the place and also that of the expressive activity, 
balancing one factor against the other. This approach, represented by 
Lamer C.J.C.’s opinion in the Commonwealth case, also designates the 
first stage of the analytical process as the appropriate venue. 
The third approach broadens the canvas still further and considers not 
only the place and the expressive activity but also the restrictive law, ex-
ploring the interaction among these three factors. This approach, which is 
exemplified in different ways by both L’Heureux-Dubé J. and McLachlin 
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J. in the Commonwealth case, holds that the matter cannot be settled at the 
initial stage but only at a later stage in the analytical process. 
I will argue that neither the first nor the second approach stands up to 
critical scrutiny and that the third approach is the only truly viable one. 
The argument consists of three propositions. For clarity, I set them out 
here at the start: 
(1) There is no place — public or private — that is categorically ex-
cluded from the protective scope of section 2(b); the contrary view 
confuses freedom of expression with the right of expressive access. 
(2) The question of location is inextricably linked to the character of the 
restrictive law, which forms an essential part of the inquiry. 
(3) The issue of location cannot be resolved at the initial stage of the 
Irwin Toy analysis, but only at a later stage where the Court consid-
ers the impugned law — preferably under section 1. 
I now explore these points in greater detail.  
1. No Places Are Excluded from Section 2(b) 
The guarantee of freedom of expression in section 2(b) extends to all 
locations within the territorial reach of the Charter. There is no place — 
public or private — that is excluded categorically from the protective 
scope of the section. 
Consider the places that have been cited as paradigmatic examples of 
locations not covered by section 2(b). These include privately owned 
property, internal government offices, air-traffic control towers, state-
owned broadcasting facilities, prison cells, judges’ chambers, the Cabinet 
Room and the Prime Minister’s office.36 
Of course, it is obvious that individuals do not have the right of free 
access to such places in order to express themselves. An aspiring Wal-
pole is not entitled to camp in the Prime Minister’s office in order to 
participate in high-level political discussions. And a budding Rumpole 
has no right to barge into a judge’s chambers to bend her ear about a 
case. But it does not follow that these places are categorically excluded 
from the scope of section 2(b). It only shows that certain laws — com-
mon law and statutory — that restrict access to such places are justified. 
                                                                                                             
36 Commonwealth, supra, note 2, at paras. 218, 227, 249, per McLachlin J.; Montréal, su-
pra, note 3, at paras. 64, 76, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Deschamps J.  
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A few examples may help clarify the point. No one can doubt the 
wisdom of regulations that limit public access to air-traffic control tow-
ers. But this does not mean that these towers fall into an expressive “dead 
zone” beyond section 2(b)’s reach. Think of a law that requires air-traffic 
controllers to communicate exclusively in English when on the job. 
There seems little doubt that such a law would infringe the controllers’ 
freedom of expression and require justification under section 1. As the 
Supreme Court held in the Ford case,37 language is so intimately related 
to the form and content of expression that there cannot be true freedom 
of expression if one is prohibited from using the language of one’s 
choice. The fact that the law relates specifically to air-traffic control tow-
ers, which are off-limits to the general public, does not insulate it from 
scrutiny under section 2(b). The same would hold true of laws governing 
the language employed by broadcasters in state-run television facilities, 
to say nothing of the language used in judges’ chambers. 
Take another example. We all know that many governmental activi-
ties require privacy and that the general public cannot reasonably claim 
unrestricted access to essentially “private” governmental offices for ex-
pressive purposes. However, it does not follow that such offices fall 
outside section 2(b)’s scope. Consider the following scenario. A public 
servant gives a reporter a confidential government document relating to 
the torture of Afghan detainees. She does this behind closed doors, in a 
government office not open to the general public. She is prosecuted for 
wrongful communication of a secret document contrary to the Security of 
Information Act.38 In her defence, she claims the protection of section 
2(b). It seems clear that her case passes the threshold for Charter protec-
tion, even though the expressive act took place in a private governmental 
office. The result would be no different if it occurred in the public ser-
vant’s own living room or for that matter a prison cell. The real question 
is whether the restrictive law is reasonable and justified — a matter emi-
nently suited for consideration under section 1. 
There is no need, perhaps, to multiply examples. But a final one may 
cap the point. High-school classrooms are not locations to which the 
general public can claim free access for expressive purposes. Considera-
tions of security, privacy and order dictate the need for strict restrictions 
on who may enter such places. This does not mean, however, that section 
                                                                                                             
37 Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 88, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, at para. 
40 (S.C.C).  
38 R.S.C. 1985, c. O-5, s. 4(1).  
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2(b) fails to protect expression in classrooms, which indeed are nurseries 
of free inquiry. The point is illustrated by the Keegstra case,39 where a 
high-school teacher was charged with the criminal offence of wilful pro-
motion of hatred40 for communicating anti-Semitic statements to his 
students in the course of his classes. The teacher argued that the Criminal 
Code provision unjustifiably infringed his freedom of expression under 
the Charter. The Supreme Court held unanimously that the teacher was 
entitled to invoke the protection of section 2(b), but went on to rule by a 
majority that the Criminal Code provision represented a reasonable limit 
under section 1. The fact that the teacher’s expressive activities took 
place in a school classroom — a location closed to the general public — 
was tacitly regarded as posing no obstacle to the application of section 
2(b). 
As these examples show, the Montréal case is wrong to suggest that a 
location may fall outside the scope of section 2(b) simply because of its 
inherent characteristics. There are no expressive dead zones. Even quintes-
sentially private places stand to benefit in certain contexts from the 
guarantee of freedom of expression. It does not, of course, follow that sec-
tion 2(b) overturns all laws restricting expressive access to such places. 
That is a different matter — one properly addressed under section 1. 
2. Location Is Linked to the Restrictive Law 
The question of location is relevant to freedom of expression only 
where a restrictive law makes it so. As such, location cannot be consid-
ered in isolation from the law that renders it significant. 
Consider this example. A “sit-in” occurs in the principal’s office of 
an Ontario public school. One of the protesters, Amanda, is charged with 
trespass contrary to section 2(1) of the Trespass to Property Act.41 An-
other protester, Bakari, is charged with the criminal offence of 
defamatory libel42 for statements written on a placard he is carrying. 
Both protesters claim the protection of section 2(b). The location of the 
expressive activity is legally significant in Amanda’s case, because the 
offence of trespass is linked essentially to the place where the expressive 
                                                                                                             
39 R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Keeg-
stra”].  
40 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 319(2).  
41 R.S.O. 1990, c. T.21. Under s. 1(2), the Act applies to school sites. 
42 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. For discussion, see R. v. Lucas, [1998] S.C.J. No. 
28, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439 (S.C.C.). 
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activity occurs. Thus, the Crown will likely argue that Amanda’s freedom 
of expression does not give her the right to enter the principal’s office to 
voice her views. But location does not arise as an issue in Bakari’s case, 
because the Criminal Code provision under which he is charged prohibits 
the publication of a libel generally – not just in certain places.43 Thus, the 
question whether Bakari has the right to be in the office is irrelevant to 
the argument, which focuses on the elements of the impugned law. In 
sum, the issue of location is a live one in Amanda’s case but not in 
Bakari’s. The difference stems from the laws under which they are 
charged. 
This point is overlooked in both the “definitional” approach taken in 
Montréal and the “balancing” approach of Lamer C.J.C. in Common-
wealth. Both maintain that the question of location may be disposed of at 
the first stage of the Irwin Toy analysis, with no reference to the im-
pugned law. Consider, for example, this passage from the Chief Justice’s 
opinion in Commonwealth: 
In my view, if the expression takes a form that contravenes or is 
inconsistent with the function of the place where the attempt to 
communicate is made, such a form of expression must be considered to 
fall outside the sphere of s. 2(b). For example, if a person tried to picket 
in the middle of a busy highway or to set up barricades on a bridge, it 
might well be concluded that such a form of expression in such a place 
is incompatible with the principal function of the place, which is to 
provide for the smooth flow of automobile traffic. In such a case, it 
could not be concluded that freedom of expression had been restricted 
if a government representative obliged the picketer to express himself 
elsewhere.44 
What is invisible here is the law that actually governs the situation. 
In reading this passage, of course, we silently supply the statutory and 
common law rules that restrict the ability of individuals to obstruct 
highways and bridges. Indeed Lamer C.J.C. tacitly refers to such laws in 
the final sentence, where he speaks of a government official obliging 
picketers to remove themselves. But the powers of officials flow entirely 
from the law — which the Chief Justice fails to specify. Without consid-
ering the scope and tenor of the restrictive law, how can we determine 
whether the picketer’s claim succeeds or fails? No doubt, certain laws 
                                                                                                             
43 This might not be the case were Bakari charged under s. 299(a), which requires that the 
libel be exhibited “in public”. However, the charge is laid under s. 299(b), which only requires that 
the libel be caused “to be read or seen”. 
44 Commonwealth, supra, note 2, at para. 21.  
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that prevent individuals from engaging in expressive activities on high-
ways represent reasonable limits on freedom of expression. But it does 
not follow that such laws are immune to constitutional scrutiny simply 
because of the location and character of the expressive conduct. The 
question of location is inextricably linked to the nature of the law in 
question — a matter best assessed under section 1. 
The point is reinforced by the Library of Parliament example dis-
cussed in Lamer C.J.C.’s judgment. The Chief Justice speaks there as if 
the question may be settled simply by determining whether the form of 
the expressive activity is compatible with the principal function of the 
library — shouting a political slogan, he intimates, is not compatible, 
while wearing a T-shirt with a slogan may well be. But the matter cannot 
be resolved so simply. We need to know something about the law that 
actually governs the case — the rules and regulations of the library, as 
underpinned by the law of property. 
Suppose a teenager on a school tour is ejected from the Library of 
Parliament for wearing a skimpy muscle shirt with the slogan “Politi-
cians suck”. He goes to court claiming that his freedom of expression has 
been violated. The government argues that the case falls outside the 
scope of section 2(b) because the Library of Parliament is not a location 
to which the general public has a general right of access. Under Lamer 
C.J.C.’s approach, the court should decide the question by asking 
whether the teenager’s conduct is compatible with the principal function 
of the place. But we cannot know which aspect of the claimant’s conduct 
is relevant without knowing the salient rule. 
Imagine two different rules, each serving as a possible basis for the 
teenager’s expulsion: 
1. “Threatening, abusive, discriminatory or harassing language or 
conduct of any kind is not allowed.” 
2. “Members of the public must wear shirts and shoes and other 
appropriate attire.” 45 
The constitutional argument takes a different form depending on 
the rule. With the first rule, under Lamer C.J.C.’s test, the question is 
whether “abusive” language — the crude slogan — is compatible with 
the function of the library. In the second case, the question is whether 
the wearing of “inappropriate” attire — the skimpy muscle shirt — is 
                                                                                                             
45 Both rules are found in the Rules of Conduct of the Toronto Public Library, reproduced 
on the website, online: <http://www.torontopubliclibrary.ca/abo_pol_rules_of_conduct.jsp>. 
270 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
compatible. We cannot know which question is correct unless we know 
which rule is being applied. The test can only be carried out by tacitly 
“smuggling” the law into the inquiry. 
In short, the restrictive law that gives rise to a claim under section 
2(b) is an essential part of the inquiry when the question of location is 
raised. Any approach that purports to resolve the matter without taking 
the law into account seems misguided. This holds true as much for the 
Montréal approach as it does for that of Lamer C.J.C.; neither approach 
permits reference to the impugned law in dealing with issues of location. 
It could be argued that, in reality, these two approaches are mainly 
concerned with rights of expressive access rather than freedom of expres-
sion more generally. That is, they are directed at cases where a person 
seeks to use section 2(b) to gain entry for expressive purposes to a place 
to which, under the general law, the public has limited or no right of ac-
cess. This focus, it is argued, explains the character of the tests advanced 
and goes a long way to making sense of them. So long as the tests are 
confined to this context they may serve a useful purpose. 
There can be little doubt that certain judges had the right of expres-
sive access primarily in mind when they crafted their approaches to the 
question of location. But even if we limit their remarks to this context, it 
does not extricate them from the difficulties already noted. The reason is 
simple. When individuals claim the right of expressive access to a loca-
tion from which they are generally barred, their claim necessarily calls 
into question certain aspects of the law which restricts their access. As 
such that law forms a vital part of the inquiry.46  
3. The Question of Location Is Best Considered under Section 1 
If the question of location does not properly arise at the first stage of 
the inquiry, it must obviously be considered at a later stage, where the 
                                                                                                             
46 Recall that restrictive laws are not confined to “written laws”, such as statutory provi-
sions, regulations or by-laws. They also take the form of common law rules — especially rules 
governing property, private and public. Although the Charter does not apply to the common law 
governing relations between private parties, it does apply to common law rules governing the actions 
of governmental parties. See R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 75, [1986] 2 
S.C.R. 573, at paras. 25-39, esp. para. 34 (S.C.C.). Moreover, the phrase “prescribed by law” in s. 1 
of the Charter has been held to include the common law: R. v. Thomsen, [1988] S.C.J. No. 31, [1988] 
1 S.C.R. 640, at para. 15 (S.C.C.), citing R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, at 
645 (S.C.C.). The point was approved in Commonwealth, supra, note 2, at paras. 157-158, per 
L’Heureux-Dubé J., and at paras. 261-262, per McLachlin J., and was reiterated in Vancouver, su-
pra, note 4, at para. 52. 
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court turns its attention to the impugned law — that is, either at the sec-
ond stage (dealing with the question of infringement) or at the third stage 
(dealing with the question of justification under section 1). As between 
the two, the final stage under section 1 offers the more suitable venue 
because it allows a court to canvass the full range of considerations aris-
ing in the concrete context of the case. 
The second stage, where a court considers whether the law infringes 
freedom of expression, offers only limited opportunities for such a re-
view. Indeed as we saw earlier, under the criteria set out in Irwin Toy, it 
must be a rare day when an impugned law is not found to infringe free-
dom of expression — at least in effect if not in purpose. One could, of 
course, revamp these criteria in order to allow a court to consider a fuller 
range of factors in a more critical light. However, such an exercise would 
involve a major departure from the Irwin Toy framework, with implica-
tions extending far beyond the current subject. 
It follows that questions pertaining to location are best determined at 
the final stage under section 1, where the court assesses whether the im-
pugned law constitutes a reasonable limit on the right. Here it is worth 
recalling the comments of Dickson C.J.C. in the Keegstra case,47 where 
he discusses the merits of section 1: 
... I agree with the general approach of Wilson J. in Edmonton Journal 
... where she speaks of the danger of balancing competing values 
without the benefit of a context. This approach does not logically 
preclude the presence of balancing within s. 2(b) — one could avoid 
the dangers of an overly abstract analysis simply by making sure that 
the circumstances surrounding both the use of the freedom and the 
legislative limit were carefully considered. I believe, however, that s. 1 
of the Charter is especially well suited to the task of balancing, and 
consider this Court’s previous freedom of expression decisions to 
support this belief. It is, in my opinion, inappropriate to attenuate the s. 
2(b) freedom on the grounds that a particular context requires such; the 
large and liberal interpretation given the freedom of expression in Irwin 
Toy indicates that the preferable course is to weigh the various 
contextual values and factors in s. 1.48 
                                                                                                             
47 Supra, note 39.  
48 Id., at para. 40.  
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The point could hardly be put better. I might only add that, in deciding 
such questions under section 1, courts will have the opportunity to de-
velop a flexible body of criteria that adapts the traditional Oakes49 test 
to the specific context of location. In so doing they may wish to recon-
sider the question of where the burden of proof appropriately lies in this 
context. 
Such a process will inevitably carry courts further down the road 
away from the simplistic premise that section 1 imports a monolithic 
standard applying to all Charter guarantees in the same way. This 
would be a welcome development. Different Charter rights require 
somewhat different forms and standards of justification, ones that are 
tailored to the particular rights in question and in effect form part of 
their basic structures.50 
                                                                                                             
49 Supra, note 12.  
50 The general point is argued in Brian Slattery, “The Pluralism of the Charter: Revisiting 
the Oakes test”, in Luc Tremblay & Grégoire Webber, The Limitation of Charter Rights: Critical 
Essays on R. v. Oakes (Montréal: Éditions Thémis, 2009), at 13-35. As Jamie Cameron says: “Over 
time, each of the guarantees will be read as though s. 1 is appended to it, in order to enable justifica-
tory criteria which is responsible to each, to evolve” (supra, note 7, at 118, note 100). 
